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Abstract  This  work  adds  to  the  debate  on  corporate  governance  regulations  and  its  effects
on performance  and  firm  value.  The  paper  empirically  tests  whether  there  is  a  significant  price
reaction  to  corporate  governance  announcements  following  the  publication  of  the  Aldama  Code
of  Best  practice  (2003)  in  Spain.  In  particular,  news  announcements  are  classified  according  to
the  code  principles  to  distinguish  among  different  dimensions  of  corporate  governance  and
have  a  better  understanding  of  investors’  reaction.  Results  show  first,  that  investors  react  to
this  kind  of  practices,  second,  that  the  sign  of  their  reaction  depends  crucially  on  the  nature
and  extension  of  the  recommendation  and  finally  that  firms  that  disclose  more  do  not  enjoy
higher  market  prices  or  return  on  the  medium-long  term.Codes;
Price  reaction;
Event  studies
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orporate  governance  structure  helps  to  solve  agency
roblems inside  organizations  (Hermalin  and  Weisbach,
003). The  managerial  power  view  of  governance  suggests
hat certain  arrangements  are  associated  with  manage-
ial rent  extraction.  Accordingly,  listed  firms  are  prompted
o follow  good  governance  practices  to  mitigate  corpo-
ate risks  (Werder  et  al.,  2005).  Codes  of  best  practice
Codes) are  considered  to  promote  governance  quality
Shleifer and  Vishny,  1997).  Provided  stock  market  func-
ions correctly,  it  should  monitor  compliance  with  Codes
nd adjust  capital  allocation  accordingly  (MacNeil  and  Li,
006).
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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However,  governance  choices  are  endogenously  decided
nd value  maximizing  decisions  for  one  firm  may  not  serve
nother. Therefore,  the  relationship  between  governance
hoices and  shareholder  value  is  ambiguous  and  may  explain
he mixed  empirical  evidence  of  previous  literature  (Larcker
t al.,  2011).  One  way  to  overcome  this  reverse  causality
roblem is  to  analyze  short  term  market  reaction  to  recently
assed corporate  governance  regulations  (Hermalin,  2010;
arcker et  al.,  2011).  Since  only  firms  whose  corporate  gov-
rnance do  not  comply  with  the  new  regulation  would  need
o make  changes,  stock  market  reaction  to  these  changes
ill give  a  direct  estimate  of  the  value  effect  associated
o corporate  changes  discarding  alternative  explanations
Kruger, 2015).
This paper  relates  to  the  analysis  of  new  corporate  gov-
rnance regulations  impact  on  value  (Larcker  et  al.,  2011;
ebchuk et  al.,  2013;  Armstrong  et  al.,  2014)  and  also  to
ode adoption  effects  on  share  value  (Black  et  al.,  2006;
oncharov et  al.,  2006;  Bebchuk  et  al.,  2009).  In  particular,
he purpose  of  this  study  is  to  analyze  whether  corporate
overnance news,  following  the  approval  of  the  Spanish  Cor-
orate Governance  Code  (Aldama  Code:  ACGC  from  now  on),
re regarded  as  a  signal  of  actually  good  corporate  gover-
ance or  if,  on  the  contrary,  they  are  not  in  fact  considered
alue-relevant at  all.  The  main  contribution  to  the  litera-
ure comes  from  the  individual  and  timeliness  analysis  of
orporate governance  announcements.  By  taking  advantage
f the  Spanish  code  classification  of  recommendations,  and
ontrary to  previous  papers  on  the  matter,  it  develops  a  dis-
ggregate analysis  to  analyze  the  effects  of  different  kinds
f corporate  governance  news.  This  is  done  with  a  unique
and-collected database  on  Spanish  firms  corporate  gover-
ance individual  announcements  for  the  period  of  existence
f the  ACGC  (2003--2005).  Spain  as  a  case  of  analysis  is  also
nteresting due  to  the  increasing  financial  activity,  secu-
ity market  expansion  and  investor  participation  increase
n those  years.
Results show  first,  that  investors  react  to  corporate
overnance announcements,  second,  that  the  sign  and  sig-
ificance of  their  reaction  depends  crucially  on  the  nature
nd extension  of  recommendations.  Therefore,  distinguish-
ng among  different  types  of  announcements  is  shown  to
e crucial  to  understand  market  reaction.  Additionally,  it  is
hown that  firms  that  disclose  more  news  on  corporate  gov-
rnance do  not  enjoy  higher  return  or  market  prices.  The
hort-run association  between  governance  and  share  value
isappears when  lengthy  periods  of  time  are  considered.
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  First,  hypotheses
re derived  and  discussed.  Second,  the  data  and  methodol-
gy used  are  presented.  Results  are  then  exposed  and  finally
e draw  some  conclusions.
ain hypotheses
rovided  existing  governance  practices  are  the  result
f managerial  rent  extraction,  regulation  that  limit
ent-extracting governance  arrangements  would  increase
hareholder value  (Larcker  et  al.,  2011).  Had  Codes’  rec-
mmendations improved  corporate  governance  practices
hrough which  outside  investors  protect  themselves  against
xpropriation by  the  insiders,  asymmetric  information  would
c
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iminish  and  capital  markets  efficiency  would  increase
MacNeil and  Li,  2006).  Therefore,  market  value  of  a  com-
any with  bad  corporate  governance  mechanisms  should  be
ower than  that  of  a  company  without  corporate  governance
roblems (Gompers  et  al.,  2003  and  Goncharov  et  al.,  2006).
ccordingly, investors  would  not  tolerate  a  higher  risk  of
xpropriation without  receiving  a  higher  risk  premium  for
uch investments.
As stated  in  the  introduction,  the  main  objective  of  ACGC
t to  define  a  set  of  recommendations  that  helps  improving
orporate governance  of  Spanish  listed  firms.  Following  the
bove discussion,  announcements  about  compliance  would
e associated  to  good  corporate  governance  practices.  Our
rst hypothesis  should  therefore  be  as  follows:
ypothesis 1.  Provided  the  ACGC  recommendations  are
enerally associated  to  good  corporate  governance  prac-
ices, announcements  about  compliance  should  have  a
ositive effect  on  stock  price.
Literature  on  voluntary  disclosure  claims  that  an  impor-
ant motivation  to  disclose  is  that  companies  want  to  send
 signal  to  the  market  to  obtain  economic  benefits  (Fung
t al.,  2007).  However,  voluntary  disclosure  is  likely  to  be
iased, because  firms  have  an  incentive  to  overstate  the
ood and  understate  their  bad  practices  (Kruger,  2015).
herefore, for  a  signal  to  be  credible,  it  must  have  economic
enefits and  it  should  be  sufficiently  costly  to  show  firm
ommitment. In  particular,  if  disclosure  of  code  compliance
ere a  credible  signal,  this  would  be  because  the  cost  of  the
ignal is  significantly  higher  for  firms  with  bad  governance
han for  firms  with  good  governance:  the  ‘‘bad’’  company
annot mimic  the  ‘‘good’’  one  (Spence,  1973).  The  content
nd costs  of  code  recommendations  will  therefore  affect
he credibility  of  the  signal.  Provided  that  recommendations
re relatively  trivial,  like  the  ones  of  formal  box-ticking,
nd costless  in  mitigating  agency  problems,  they  may  not
e considered  as  a  credible  signal  (Arcot  and  Bruno,  2006).
ccordingly, markets  will  not  react  or  even  react  negatively.
herefore, investors  will  be  sensitive  to  corporate  gover-
ance practices  that  are  costly  for  the  firm,  since  they  would
e the  ones  that  allow  distinguishing  between  ‘‘good’’  and
‘bad’’ firms.  In  this  case,  as  Lombardo  and  Pagano  (2002)
uggest shareholders  would  be  willing  to  pay  higher  price
or firms  that  follow  code  recommendations  that  reduce
xpropriation risks.  We  then  can  formulate  the  following
ypothesis:
ypothesis 1b.  The  more  trivial  and  less  costly  the  ACGC
ecommendation announced  to  comply,  the  less  of  the  pos-
tive impact  it  has  on  the  value  of  the  company.
ata and methodology
ata
arket  reaction  to  corporate  governance  news  related  to
ompliance with  the  code  approved  in  2003  is  analyzed.
CGC is  an  attempt  to  balance  effective  legal  protection
o shareholders,  basic  for  capital  market  development,
nd flexibility  demanded  by  listed  companies  to  organize
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cDo  investors  react  to  corporate  governance  news?  
their  own  governing  bodies.  For  instance,  ACGC’s  recom-
mendations collect  legal  prescriptions  determined  by  the
Spanish Capital  Market  Act  passed  in  2002  and  disclosure
requirements established  in  the  law  26/2003.  We  construct
a unique  database  on  Spanish  listed  companies.  The  com-
panies included  have  belonged  to  the  IBEX  35  index  during
the period  when  ACGC  applies.  The  composition  of  this
index changes  from  year  to  year.  In  the  period  of  analysis
42 companies  belonged  to  it  in  different  moments  of  time,
therefore 42  firms  are  included  in  the  analysis.
The  companies  in  the  IBEX  35  represent  77.7%  of  the  total
value of  shares  traded  on  the  stock  market  in  2006.  Despite
the growing  market  capitalization  (41.4%  increase  along  the
period, value  equal  to  72.6%  of  nominal  GDP),  equity  market
capitalization is  still  very  concentrated  and  IBEX-35  firms’
trading volume  account  for  94.3%  of  the  market  in  2006.  The
panel of  42  companies  represents  more  than  80%  of  the  total
value traded.  Concentrating  in  these  companies  is  interest-
ing since  larger  companies  get  more  attention  and  are  more
scrutinized by  the  media  and  investor  community.  Moreover,
larger companies  can  afford  to  comply  more  easily  due  to
scale economies,  since  the  cost  of  compliance  is  fixed,  at
least to  some  extent  (Akkermans  et  al.,  2007).
As  corporate  governance  announcements,  we  consider
news related  to  compliance  of  different  corporate  gover-
nance recommendations  included  in  the  ACGC.  To  identify
these announcements,  we  analyze  different  sources:  first  of
all, the  Stock  Exchange  Commission  (CNMV)  formal  commu-
nication records  that  collect  all  relevant  actions  taken  by
firms: financial  news,  shareholding  changes,  adoption  of
best practices,  etc.  Second,  we  revise  annual  reports  on  cor-
porate governance  and  on  financial  statements  to  verify  the
information compiled  by  the  CNMV;  and,  third,  we  check
the LexisNexis  database,  which  collects  all  company  arti-
cles published  in  the  main  economic  newspapers  to  account
whether some  information  was  released  in  the  newspapers
before than  provided  to  the  market  regulator.  When  the
same announcement  is  found  in  more  than  one  source,  we
use the  date  it  was  first  published.  This  allows  for  an  anal-
ysis of  the  price  reaction  the  day  the  information  arrives
to the  market.  We  find  271  pieces  of  news  related  to  the
ACGC. Some  filters  are  applied  to  isolate  announcements
related to  governance.  In  particular,  when  they  coincide
with other  relevant  events,  such  as  dividends,  stock  options
plans, takeover  and  profit  prospects’  announcements,  they
are removed  from  the  sample.  The  final  sample  comprises
224 announcements.
ACGC focuses  on  three  aspects  of  corporate  governance:
transparency, managers’  fiduciary  duties,  and  company  gov-
erning bodies.  With  all  this  information  we  develop  a
database with  news  on  ACGC,  the  date  it  was  publicly  dis-
closed and  the  type  of  governance  announcement.
Each  type  of  corporate  governance  measure  could
have different  costs.  First,  fiduciary  duty  recommendations
require boards  to  apply  high  ethical  standards  and  devote
enough time  and  energy  to  the  performance  of  their  duties.
For example  board  members  should  not  be  overburdened  by
multiple directorships.  This  kind  of  recommendations  has
direct  costs  due  to  the  process  but  also,  may  have  indirect
costs related  to  network  relations  and  conflicts  of  interests
(Laan, 2009;  Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2004).  However,
this formality  may  have  little  consequences  for  corporate
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ctivity  (Akkermans  et  al.,  2007)  and  recommendations  on
duciary duties  may  be  easy  to  adopt  from  a  formal  point
f view.  Further,  due  to  code  ambiguities  (to  guarantee  firm
exibility) it  is  also  difficult  to  evaluate  announcements  and
ompanies’ commitment  with  the  recommendations  on  fidu-
iary duties  (CNMV,  2006).
Second,  transparency  recommendations  can  be  more
emanding, since  companies  must  reveal  information  that
ould otherwise  be  kept  private.  The  ACGC  principle  in  this
rea is  that  the  disclosure  duty  implies  adopting  measures
o guarantee  the  correctness  and  usefulness  of  corporate
overnance information  (Aldama,  2003).  Furthermore,  firms
hould provide  information  about  the  company  ownership
tructure and  management,  related-party  and  intra-group
ransactions, risk  control  systems,  functioning  of  the  share-
older meeting.  It  also  suggests  different  instruments  of
isclosure. Therefore,  comply  with  transparency  recom-
endations would  have  information  costs,  but  also  costs
ssociated to  the  explanation  and  justification  of  disclosure
for instance,  ordering  and  publishing  independent  reports
y rating  agencies  or  analysts,  development  and  mainte-
ance of  a  webpage)  in  order  to  assure  information  quality
nd credibility.
Third, recommendations  related  to  governing  bodies
mply an  active  commitment  by  companies  to  good  corpo-
ate governance.  First,  external  control  is  enhanced  through
he empowerment  of  shareholder  meeting  as  the  firm  basic
ecision making  body.  Second,  the  introduction  of  external
nd independent  directors  in  the  board  and  the  guaran-
ee that  such  directors  should  be  able  to  comply  with  their
uties adequately  and  in  equally  terms  with  insiders.  This
mplies not  only  information  but  also  coordination  costs.
urther, in  the  case  of  the  ACGC,  board  commissions  and
ommittees should  be  created  and  incorporated  into  the
ecision making  process  and  should  have  a  relevant  number
f independent  members,  for  instance  the  new  nomina-
ion and  remuneration  committee.  The  incorporation  of  new
ommissions and  committees  has  direct  costs  for  the  firm.
oreover, to  comply  with  these  recommendations,  compa-
ies are  legally  enforced  to  adapt  their  bylaws  and  change
urrent practices  when  necessary,  especially  on  the  nomi-
ation process.  Therefore,  recommendations  on  governing
odies imply  higher  costs.  Furthermore,  legally  enforced
ecommendations may  have  more  credibility,  since  author-
ties monitor  the  implementation  of  legal  provisions  and
ence the  degree  of  compliance  with  the  recommendations
ay be  easier  to  evaluate.
Following  the  above  discussion,  we  will  consider  fiduciary
ecommendations to  be  the  more  trivial  and  recommen-
ations on  governing  bodies  to  be  the  least  trivial  and
ost costly.  Recommendations  on  transparency  would  lie
etween the  two.
Table 1  presents  a  summary  of  announcements.  Panel  A
lassifies events  by  type  and  year.  News  related  to  fidu-
iary duties  account  for  16.38,  11.25  and  3.57%  for  2003,
004 and  2005  respectively.  The  observed  decreasing  trend
ould indicate  an  initial  effort  to  comply  with  the  new
ode. Similar  tendency  is  evidenced  for  recommendations
n governing  bodies  (70.69,  41.25  and  39.29%);  however,
ews on  transparency  presents  a  positive  trend  (12.93,  47.5
nd 57.14%).  The  concentration  of  certain  types  of  news
n 2003,  especially  those  related  to  governing  bodies,  is
16  N.  Utrero-González,  F.  J.  Callado-Mun˜oz
Table  1  Description  of  ACGC  announcements.
Panel  A:  News  classification  and  percentage  in  sample
Type  of  event 2003  2004  2005
Fiduciary  duty  16.38%  11.25%  3.57%
Transparency  and  information  duty  12.93%  47.50%  57.14%
Governing  bodies  70.69%  41.25%  39.29%
Number  of  ACGC  announcements  116  80  28
Panel  B:  Summary  of  ACGC  announcements  by  sector  along  the  period
Sector  Events  Trading  volume
Consumer  goods 8.92%  6.3%
Petrol  and  power  33.03%  22.3%
Financial  services  and  real  state  13.39%  35.47%
Industry  and  construction  20.53%  6.03%
Market  services  14.76%  5%
Technology  and  telecommunication  9.37%  24.9%
Spanish Stock Exchange Sector Classification as of 01/01/2005.
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temarkable.  It  would  suggest  that  ACGC  recommendations
n governing  bodies  are  binding  for  many  firms.  Panel  B
s a  summary  of  the  events  by  economic  sector  according
o the  CNMV  classification.  Petrol  and  power  is  the  lead-
ng sector,  followed  by  industry  and  construction.  The  third
ost relevant  sector  is  market  services.  It  is  remarkable
ow the  financial  services  sector  is  ranked  fourth  in  adopting
CGC recommendations.  Further,  if  we  compare  number  of
nnouncements and  trading  volume  by  sector,  we  find  inter-
sting evidence  as  well.  The  most  relevant  sectors,  financial
ervices and  technology  and  communication  (35.47%  and
4.9% of  trading  volume  respectively)  are  ranked  fourth  and
fth in  ACGC  announcements.  A  possible  interpretation  is
hat financial  firms’  corporate  arrangements  were  comply-
ng with  the  recommendations  prior  to  the  ACGC  approval.
his is  especially  interesting  since  financing  companies  usu-
lly demand  transparency  and  good  governance  practices
rom their  potential  borrowers  and  clients.  Similar  evidence
or financial  firms  was  found  in  the  analysis  of  the  Olivencia
ode adoption  (Bilbao  Calabuig,  2004).
ethodology
he  role  of  the  ACGC  announcements  is  assessed  by  means
f value  relevance  analysis.  From  a  general  point  of  view,
‘some amount  is  defined  as  value  relevant  if  it  has  a pre-
icted association  with  the  equity  market  values’’  (Barth
t al.,  2001).  Two  types  of  studies  are  common  in  the  litera-
ure to  evaluate  the  value  relevance  of  information  (Kothari,
001): association  study  and  event  study  designs.  An  asso-
iation study  ‘‘tests  for  a  positive  correlation  between
n accounting  performance  measure  and  stock  returns,
oth measured  over  relatively  long,  contemporaneous  time
eriods, e.g.,  one  year’’  (Kothari,  2001).  An  event  study
‘infers whether  an  event,  such  as  an  earnings  announce-
ent, conveys  new  information  to  market  participants  as
eflected in  changes  in  the  level  or  variability  of  security
rices or  trading  volume  over  a  short  time  period  around  the
m
u
d
(vent’’  (Kothari,  2001,  p.  116).  We  will  use  both  techniques
o provide  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  possible  impact  of  cor-
orate governance  news  related  to  codes  of  best  practice  on
tock prices.  This  allows  for  an  evaluation  of  the  usefulness
f information  revealed  by  firms  in  the  short  and  long  run  to
nvestors, in  this  case  related  to  news  on  ACGC.
The  event  study  methodology  has  been  extensively  used
o analyze  market  reactions  to  different  pieces  of  news
Kothari and  Warner,  2007).  With  this  type  of  methodol-
gy, the  semi-strong  hypothesis  of  capital  market  efficiency
s assumed;  that  is,  new  public  information  is  continually
ssessed, valued,  and  reflected  in  the  stock  price,  which
ncludes current  and  expected  firm  financial  performance.
espite the  wide  use  of  this  methodology,  our  research
bjective may  have  some  limitations.  First,  it  is  not  clear
ow fast  Spanish  market  reacts  to  new  information.  The
hoice of  a  (too)  narrow  window  can  lead  to  the  false  conclu-
ion that  some  value-relevant  information  is  not  associated
ith market  prices.  Second,  the  main  concern  of  an  event
tudy is  the  timeliness  of  information,  yet  it  may  be  the  case
hat some  of  the  information  disclosed  as  a  consequence  of
he code  adoption  was  already  known  by  investors  through
he disclosure  of  recent  financial  statements.
The  association  methodology  has  been  successfully
mplemented  to  analyze  different  topics:  environmental
olicy (Hassel  et  al.,  2005),  R&D  capitalization  (Cazavan-
eny and  Jeanjean,  2006)  and  also  corporate  governance
Goncharov et  al.,  2006).  The  Ohlson  model  will  be  used  as
 framework  that  allows  the  estimation  of  the  proportion  of
he firm  value  that  is  related  to  firm’s  corporate  governance
nnouncements possible.
Market  participants  will  base  trading  decisions  on  present
nformation about  future  performance  but  not  all  informa-
ion available  is  used  in  the  decision-making  process.  The
ain issue  in  this  methodology  is  to  choose  the  right  val-
ation model  to  reduce  potential  econometric  problems
ue to  heteroskedasticity  and  correlated  omitted  variables
Kothari, 2001).
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Event  study
Once the  events  to  be  analyzed  are  defined  (in  our  case,
news on  different  aspects  of  ACGC),  the  effect  each  event
has on  the  stock  price  must  be  calculated.  For  this,  we
proceed in  two  stages.  First,  we  estimate  the  ‘‘normal’’
expected return  for  each  stock  (adjusted  for  dividends).  This
expected return  is  obtained  by  means  of  a  valuation  model.
In this  case,  similar  to  previous  studies  with  this  methodol-
ogy, we  use  the  market  model  that  seems  most  appropriate.
This model  relates  the  return  of  a  certain  stock  to  the  market
return:
Rit =  ˛i +  ˇiRmt +  εit (1)
where  Rit is  the  return  of  stock  i at  time  t,  Rmt is  market
return at  time  t,  εit is  the  residual  term  of  stock  i  at  time
t, and  ˛i and  ˇi are  the  parameters  to  be  estimated.  The
return variables  are  expressed  as  logarithms  and  Rit includes
the dividend  payout.  The  Índice  General  de  Bolsa  de  Madrid
(IGBM) index  is  considered  the  market  index.  The  calcula-
tion of  the  expected  return  is  made  170  to  20  days  before  the
event. This  period  is  known  as  the  estimation  window  (−170,
−20). Therefore,  we  take  into  account  a  long  period  prior  to
the announcement  (151  days).  Since  the  estimation  period
ends 20  days  before  the  event  date,  the  risk  that  the  esti-
mated returns  are  affected  by  information  about  the  event
is minimized.
Second, we  calculate  the  abnormal  outcome  caused  by
the event.  The  abnormal  return  (AR)  is  defined  as  the  differ-
ence between  the  actual  and  predicted  returns  during  the
event window  (ARit =  Rit −  E(Rit)).  The  calculations  are  made
for different  event  window  lengths  around  the  announce-
ment day,  since  results  can  be  sensitive  to  the  event  window
size. In  particular,  we  consider  t  days  around  the  event  date,
where t =  (−7,  7).  This  period  was  chosen  by  taking  into
account previous  papers,  see  Kothari  and  Warner  (2007).
Once the  ARit are  estimated,  the  average  AR  for  each  day  of
the event  day  is  computed:
ARt = 1
N
N∑
i=1
ARit (2)
We  compute  also  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  dif-
ferent subperiods  in  the  pre  and  post  announcement  dates:
CARt =
2∑
t=1
ARt (3)
Abnormal  returns  estimated  through  ordinary  least
squares (OLS)  could  be  biased  due  to  the  persistent  volatility
of daily  returns.  Following  Bollerslev  et  al.  (1994),  the  model
is corrected  through  a  GARCH  (1,1)  to  control  for  the  con-
ditional heteroskedasticity  of  financial  returns.  Therefore,
the variance  of  each  stock  is  modeled  as
2t =  ω  +  ıε2t−1 +  2t−1 (4)A  second  problem  associated  with  financial  assets  is  infre-
quent trading.  However,  since  the  stocks  of  our  sample
present the  highest  trading  volume  in  the  Spanish  market,
we do  not  consider  this  a  serious  concern.
i
n
S
i17
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he major  issue  in  this  field  of  research  is  the  choice  of
 valuation  model.  One  of  the  most  popular  models  is  that
eveloped by  Ohlson  (1995).  This  model  was  previously  used,
or example,  by  Hassel  et  al.  (2005)  and  Goncharov  et  al.
2006) among  others.  The  underlying  assumptions  are  (a)  the
arket value  equals  the  present  value  of  future  dividends,
b) a  clean  surplus  relationship,  and  (c)  linear  information
ynamics. Based  on  these  three  assumptions,  firm  value  can
e  represented  as  a  linear  function  of  the  book  value  of
quity, the  present  value  of  expected  future  abnormal  earn-
ngs (i.e.,  earnings  less  the  charge  for  capital),  and  other
alue-relevant non-accounting  information.  In  the  empiri-
al implementation  of  the  Ohlson  model,  the  market  value
P) is  expressed  as  a  function  of  a  constant,  the  book  value  of
quity (BV),  earnings  per  share  (EPS),  and  the  error  term  (as
sed in  Naceur  and  Goaied,  2004;  Goncharov  et  al.,  2006):
it =  ˛0 +  ˛1BVit +  ˛2EPSit +  uit (5)
This  equation  is  labeled  as  the  price  model.  The  inter-
ept captures  the  mean  effect  of  other  value-relevant
nformation. Regression  residuals  pick  up  the  effect  of  non-
ccounting  information.  The  downside  of  the  price  equation
s that  severe  econometric  problems  can  be  caused  by  het-
roskedasticity and  correlated  omitted  variables  (Kothari,
001).
An alternative  to  the  price  model  is  the  return  specifica-
ion. This  model  can  be  obtained  by  taking  first  differences
n the  variables  on  both  sides  of  the  price  model.  Therefore,
hanges in  stock  prices  (including  dividends)  are  regressed
n earnings  per  share  (EPS)  and  changes  in  earnings  (EPS).
it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1EPSit +  ˇ2 DEPSit +  vit (6)
One  advantage  of  this  return  model  is  that  it  controls
or any  serial  correlation  that  may  exist  among  observa-
ions. The  second  advantage  is  that  it  mitigates  the  effects
f omitted  variables  (Easton,  1999).  Using  the  price  model
n addition  to  the  return  model  may  allow  more  definitive
nferences (Kothari  and  Zimmerman,  1995).  Therefore  both
pecifications are  used  to  obtain  statistically  robust  results.
To  incorporate  all  financial  and  non-financial  informa-
ion into  price  and  return  models,  we  compute  price  and
eturn variables  for  a  one-year  period  ending  six  months
fter the  balance  sheet  date  (December  31).  BV,  EPS  and
EPS as  book  value,  earnings  per  share  and  change  in  earn-
ngs per  share  of  firm  i for  year  t  (December  31).  In  the
mpirical implementation,  we  first  estimate  the  proposed
quations and,  afterwards,  introduce  the  corporate  gov-
rnance variable  CG  for  the  degree  of  disclosure  related
o the  ACGC  announcements  for  each  year  t,  as  our  proxy
or value-relevant  non-accounting  information.  Additionally,
s highlighted  previously,  we  differentiate  between  three
ypes of  announcements,  pertaining  to  transparency,  fidu-
iary duty,  and  governance  bodies’  recommendations  as
ell. To  capture  the  degree  of  disclosure  with  the  whole
ode and  the  different  types  of  recommendations,  we  first
ompute the  percentage  of  disclosure.  This  is  defined  as  the
elative importance  of  the  number  of  announcements  real-
zed  by  each  firm  in  every  respect  for  a  given  year  to  the  total
umber of  announcements  made  by  all  firms  in  that  year.
econd, we  construct  a dummy  variable  taking  a value  of  one
f the  percentage  of  announcement  is  greater  than  the  year
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Table  2  Variables  used  in  the  value  relevance  analysis.
Panel  A:  Descriptive  statistics
Mean  Sd  Q1  Median  Q3
P  22.0387  17.9268  11.2500  16.8200  26.3200
R  0.2247  0.28003  0.0762  0.2361  0.3941
BV  7.3928  7.1315  2.9746  6.1857  9.6774
EPS  0.9682  1.2759  0.1114  0.5624  1.2200
EPS 0.02705  0.0704  0.0009  0.0096  0.03163
Panel B:  Correlation  analysis  for  the  relevance  analysis
P  BV  EPS  CG  Fiduciary  Transparency  Gov.  bodies
Price  specification
P 1
BV 0.6634*** 1
EPS 0.6020*** 0.3658*** 1
CG 0.0643  0.1265  0.1059  1
Fiduciary −0.1870* −0.0988  −0.1460  0.4238*** 1
Transparency 0.1333  0.0819  0.2625*** 0.5181*** 0.1404  1
Gov. bodies  0.0584  0.1195  0.0309  0.4129*** 0.1077  0.0793  1
Rent  EPS  EPS  CG  Fiduciary  Transparency  Gov.  bodies
Return  specification
R 1
EPS  0.1455  1
EPS  0.2410** 0.0324  1
CG  0.0682* 0.1059  0.1890* 1
Fiduciary  −0.1503  −0.1460  0.1344  0.4238*** 1
Transparency  0.1510  0.2625*** 0.0159  0.5181*** 0.1404  1
Gov.  bodies  0.0140  0.0309  0.0049  0.4129*** 0.1077  0.0793  1
P is stock price, R is stock return, BV is book value of equity, EPS is the earnings per share ratio, EPS is changes in earnings per share,
CG is the degree of disclosure of the ACGC and Fiduciary, Transparency and Gov. bodies are the degree of disclosure of different types
of recommendations.
* Statistical significance at 10 percent.
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edian  and  zero  otherwise.  Table  2  presents  the  descrip-
ive statistics  (panel  A)  and  correlations  (panel  B)  between
he main  variables  and  the  variables  related  to  the  ACGC
nnouncements. CG  is  positively  correlated  with  returns  at
0% level  but  the  correlation  between  price  and  CG  news  is
ot significant,  although  positive  as  well.  Looking  at  news
bout different  aspects  of  the  code,  only  announcements
n fiduciary  duty  are  significantly  correlated  with  price.  A
ultivariate analysis  will  be  performed  in  the  next  section.
mpirical findings
vent  study  analysis
able  3 shows  the  results  of  ACGC  announcements  computed
or different  days  and  periods  around  the  event  day  for  AR
nd CAR.  Panel  A  presents  the  results  for  the  complete  sam-
le and  panel  B collects  the  results  for  each  year  individually.
n both  cases,  the  market  model  is  estimated  through  OLS
nd GARCH  (1,1)  respectively.  For  both  models,  there  is  a
ositive and  significant  AR  the  day  after  the  announcement
a
t0.14%  and  0.16%,  respectively).  The  CAR  values,  at  the  bot-
om of  Table  3  of  panel  A,  are  also  positive  and  significant  for
he periods  (−7,  7),  (0,  3),  (0,  5),  and  (0,  7).  This  positive
ign implies  that  investors  react  favorably  to  the  commu-
ication of  news  related  to  compliance  with  the  ACGC.
herefore, evidence  supporting  Hypothesis  1  is  found  for  the
CGC. This  result  is  in  line  with  Fernández-Rodríguez  et  al.
2004) who  analyze  annual  corporate  governance  report  but
id  not  take  into  account  the  timeliness  of  the  individual
nnouncements.
Taking into  account  the  year  when  the  announcement  is
ade, we  get  interesting  results  as  well.  According  to  panel
, market  reacts  more  slowly  the  first  year  of  ACGC  and
ore rapidly  at  the  end  of  the  period.  This  change  indicates
hat Spanish  market  is  increasingly  concerned  about  ACGC
ecommendations’ adoption.  Similarly,  Bebchuk  et  al.  (2013)
ighlight the  necessity  of  changes  in  the  attention  paid  to
overnance by  market  participants  to  explain  evidence  of
bnormal returns  associated  to  corporate  strategies.
Table  4,  panel  A  through  C,  presents  results  when  we  dis-
inguish by  the  type  of  announcement  using  the  classification
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Table  3  Event  analysis.
Panel  A:  Effects  of  ACGC  News  (N  =  224)
Day  Estimation  of  market  model  through  OLS  Estimation  of  market  model  through  GARCH  (1,1)
Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t
−7  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.21
−6  −0.10  −1.13  −0.07  −0.83
−5  −0.05  −0.68  −0.05  −0.64
−4  0.05  0.55  −0.06  0.68
−3  0.01  0.17  0.02  0.28
−2  −0.01  −0.14  0.00  −0.03
−1 0.03 0.38 0.05 0.60
0 −0.01  −0.08  0.00  0.01
1  0.14* 1.79  0.16** 1.99
2  0.06 0.48 0.07 0.55
3 0.11  1.58  0.12* 1.68
4  0.09  1.18  0.10  1.35
5  0.04  0.55  0.05  0.74
6  0.16*** 2.03  0.17*** 2.20
7  0.02  0.22  0.03  0.37
(−7,7) 0.54* 1.69  0.73*** 2.34
(−5,0)  0.02  0.09  0.07  0.39
(−3,0)  0.02  0.16  0.07  0.44
(−1,0)  0.02  0.20  0.05  0.43
(−1,1)  0.16  1.19  0.20  1.51
(0,1)  0.13  1.10  0.16  1.31
(0,3)  0.31* 1.71  0.34** 1.95
(0,5)  0.43*** 2.07  0.50*** 2.42
(0,7)  0.61*** 2.67  0.71*** 3.13
Panel  B:  Effects  of  AGCG  News  by  year
Day  2003  2004  2005
OLS  GARCH  (1,1)  OLS  GARCH  (1,1)  OLS  GARCH  (1,1)
Art  (%) t  Art  (%) t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t
−7  0.004  0.026  0.0075  0.0502  −0.04  −0.41  −0.001  −0.14  0.13  0.61  0.16  0.76
−6  −0.1  −0.7  −0.103  −0.69  −0.15  −1.42  −0.095  −0.89  0.08  0.59  0.11  0.8
−5  −0.11  −0.88  −0.12  −0.96  0.02  0.16  0.034  0.33  −0.02  −0.11  0.0009  0.0056
−4  0.09  0.68  0.08  0.61  0.01  0.11  0.046  0.4  −0.04  −0.24  −0.01  −0.09
−3 −0.07  −0.56  −0.068  −0.52  0.16  1.47  0.17  1.48  −0.06  −0.35  −0.02  −0.11
−2  0.07  0.59  0.075  0.56  −0.08  −0.71  −0.06  −0.52  −0.17  −0.92  −0.15  −0.78
−1  0.043  0.41  0.053  0.52  −0.07  −0.52  −0.046  −0.34  0.25  1.11  0.28  1.21
0  −0.06  −0.41  −0.06  −0.45  −0.02  −0.18  0.001  0.0091  0.26* 1.77  0.29* 1.94
1  0.02  0.21  0.03  0.26  0.22* 1.86  0.25** 2.09  0.37** 2.71  0.39*** 2.87
2  0.11  0.46  0.1  0.46  0.02  0.23  0.03  0.34  −0.03  −0.2  −0.003  −0.021
3  0.21* 1.94  0.22* 1.95  0.02  0.3  0.04  0.42  −0.08  −0.44  −0.06  −0.35
4  0.14  1.11  0.14  1.13  0.07  0.95  0.09  1.2  −0.1  −0.72  −0.07  −0.49
5  0.14  1.2  0.13  1.14  −0.13  −1.29  −0.09  −1.01  0.11  0.93  0.13  1.11
6  0.18  1.54  0.17  1.49  0.19  1.57  0.23* 1.85  −0.03  −0.2  −0.001  −0.04
7  0.15  1.12  0.16  1.14  −0.01  −0.11  0.004  0.04  −0.45  −1.67  −0.41  −1.52
(−7,7)  0.83  1.61  0.83  1.63  0.23  0.52  0.6  1.43  0.19  0.35  0.62  1.14
(−5,0)  −0.03  −0.13  −0.14  −0.41  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.1  0.21  0.49  0.66  1.44
(−3,0)  −0.01  −0.06  −0.04  −0.17  −0.07  −0.03  0.14  0.49  0.28  0.74  0.38  0.89
(−1,0)  −0.01  −0.11  −0.01  −0.09  −0.09  −0.52  −0.04  −0.26  0.52* 1.9  0.57** 2.11
(−1,1)  0.006  0.03  0.01  0.08  0.13  0.64  0.21  0.99  0.89** 2.73  0.96*** 2.97
(0,1)  −0.03  −0.19  −0.03  −0.19  0.2  1.23  0.25  1.53  0.63*** 2.81  0.68*** 3.01
(0,3)  0.28  0.93  0.28  0.94  0.25  1.17  0.33  1.54  0.51** 2.01  0.61** 2.44
(0,5)  0.56  1.58  0.56  1.59  0.21  0.83  0.33  1.42  0.52* 1.67  0.68** 2.11
(0,7)  0.91** 2.34  0.9** 2.37  0.38  1.37  0.57** 2.08  0.02  0.06  0.25  0.65
* p value < 0.1.
** p value < 0.05.
*** p value < 0.01.
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Table  4  Event  analysis  by  corporate  governance  dimension.
Day  Panel  A  Panel  B  Panel  C
Fiduciary  duty  (N  =  29)  Transparency  (N  =  69)  Governing  bodies  (N  =  126)
OLS  GARCH  (1,1)  OLS  GARCH  (1,1)  OLS  GARCH  (1,1)
Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t  Art  (%)  t
−7  −0.03  −0.19  −0.04  −0.28  −0.04  −0.35  −0.03  −0.21  0.04  0.26  0.06  0.41
−6 0.23  1.03  0.25  1.14  −0.06  −0.47  −0.02  −0.21  −0.20  −1.49  −0.17  −1.30
−5 −0.32*** −2.09  −0.33*** −2.20  0.20  1.57  0.20  1.56  −0.13  −1.18  −0.13  −1.11
−4 −0.33  −1.62  −0.31  −1.54  −0.06  −0.35  −0.05  −0.28  0.02* 1.92  0.20*** 2.00
−3 0.32*** 2.01  0.34*** 2.08  0.16  1.32  0.18  1.42  −0.14  −1.14  −0.13  −1.09
−2 0.38*** 2.30  0.38*** 2.27  −0.13  −1.15  −0.13  −1.13  −0.03  −0.25  −0.02  −0.13
−1 0.26  1.11  0.31  1.20  −0.06  −0.35  −0.04  −0.28  0.02  0.23  0.04  0.43
0 −0.62  −1.46  −0.62  −1.48  0.03  0.27  0.04  0.31  0.11  0.99  0.12  1.09
1 −0.09  −0.59  −0.09  −0.56  0.14  1.07  0.16  1.24  0.19* 1.70  0.21* 1.84
2 0.09  0.38  0.10  0.41  0.05  0.40  0.05  0.39  0.05  0.27  0.07  0.34
3 −0.07  −0.38  −0.08  −0.38  0.03  0.27  0.05  0.39  0.20*** 2.00  0.21*** 2.04
4 0.00  −0.01  0.03  0.21  −0.08  −0.94  −0.07  −0.84  0.20* 1.68  0.22* 1.79
5 −0.06  −0.24  −0.04  −0.18  0.15  1.22  0.16  1.39  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.13
6 −0.23  −1.54  −0.22  −1.51  0.29** 1.99  0.29*** 2.07  0.18  1.62  0.20  1.76
7 0.10  0.62  0.14  0.84  −0.14  −1.07  −0.13  −1.01  0.09  0.64  0.10  0.73
(−7,7) −0.35  −0.39  −0.19  −0.22  0.49  0.98  0.66  1.36  0.77* 1.68  0.97*** 2.19
(−5,0) −0.28  −0.41  −0.23  −0.34  0.15  0.48  0.19  0.60  0.01  0.04  0.08  0.31
(−3,0) 0.38  0.59  0.42  0.66  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.15  −0.04  −0.23  0.01  0.03
(−1,0) −0.33  −0.62  −0.31  −0.59  −0.02  −0.12  −0.01  −0.03  0.13  1.02  0.16  1.25
(−1,1) −0.43  −0.73  −0.40  −0.71  0.12  0.55  0.00  0.76  0.32* 1.92  0.36*** 2.18
(0,1) −0.71  −1.48  −0.71  −1.51  0.17  0.96  0.20  1.11  0.30** 1.96  0.33*** 2.13
(0,3) −0.70  −1.07  −0.69  −1.09  0.26  1.18  0.30  1.38  0.55*** 2.19  0.60*** 2.38
(0,5) −0.76  −1.00  −0.70  −0.95  0.33  1.27  0.39  1.54  0.75*** 2.57  0.83*** 2.81
(0,7) −0.89  −1.25  −0.79  −1.17  0.48  1.42  0.56* 1.66  1.02*** 3.18  1.12*** 3.55
* p value < 0.1.
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*** p value < 0.01.
n  Table  1:  fiduciary  duties,  transparency,  and  governing
odies. As  in  Table  3,  AR  and  CAR  are  shown  for  differ-
nt days  and  periods  and  estimated  through  OLS  and  GARCH
1,1).
Table 4  panel  A  presents  results  for  fiduciary  duties.  On
he day  of  the  announcement,  there  is  a  negative  but  not  sig-
ificant reaction  (−0.61%).  There  is  no  significant  reaction
fter the  day  of  the  event  either.  Therefore,  results  suggest
hat the  Spanish  market  does  not  react  to  these  kinds  of
nnouncements. One  possible  explanation  is  that  fiduciary
ecommendations are  considered  trivial,  easy  to  comply  and
ot credible  enough  therefore,  not  affecting  market  price
Hypothesis 1b).  Alternatively,  it  could  be  that  companies
ere already  complying  with  this  kind  of  recommendations
nd therefore  there  is  no  reaction.  Announcements  related
o transparency  (see  Table  4,  panel  B)  present  positive  AR
alues on  the  day  of  the  event  and  the  day  after  (0.03  and
.14 respectively).  However,  this  price  effect  is  not  signifi-
ant. The  only  day  when  this  reaction  is  significant  is  on  the
ixth day  after  the  event.  If  CAR  values  are  considered,  again
here are  not  significant  results.  Compliance  with  trans-
arency rules  and  CNMV  disclosure  requirements  enhance
nformation availability  for  investors  and  shareholders.  But
CGC  announcements  in  this  respect  do  not  seem  to  imply  a
p
1
e
carket  reaction,  since  they  are  not  conveying  new  informa-
ion to  the  market.  It  could  suggest  that  market  anticipated
orrectly or  that  the  new  provisions  do  not  affect  value.
his idea  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that  the  firm  can  use
imilar, but  unregulated  provisions.  The  flexible  structure
dopted in  ACGC  could  be  an  explanation  since  it  would
ccept current  arrangements.  This  problem  was  acknowl-
dged in  2007  when  a  normalized  structure  of  the  annual
orporate governance  report  was  adopted  to  make  infor-
ation comparable  between  firms  and  facilitate  investor
nalysis (CNMV,  Circular  4/2007).
Finally,  Table  4,  panel  C  shows  the  results  for  gover-
ing bodies’  announcements.  First  of  all,  the  market  seems
o react  more  significantly  to  this  type  of  announcements
han to  the  others  just  presented  (panel  A  and  B).  In  par-
icular, there  is  a  positive  significant  reaction  four  days
efore the  day  of  the  announcement  (0.02),  on  the  day  after
he announcement  (0.19),  as  well  as  three  and  four  days
fterwards (0.20,  0.20  respectively).  Considering  different
eriods around  the  event  day,  again  there  are  significant
rice reactions  during  several  time  intervals:  (−7,  7),  (−1,
), (0,  1),  (0,  3),  (0,  5),  and  (0,  7).  Therefore,  news  on  gov-
rning bodies’  recommendations,  the  least  trivial  and  most
ostly, are  the  most  valued  by  markets  (Hypothesis  1).
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Table  5  Comparison  between  news  on  governing  bodies  versus  fiduciary  and  transparency.
Day  Panel  A:  OLS  Panel  B:  GARCH
Fidu/transp  Gov.  bodies  t  Fidu/transp  Gov.  bodies  t
−7  −0.4  0.04  −0.42  −0.03  0.06  −0.48
−6  0.02  −0.20  1.23  0.05  −0.17  1.27
−5  0.04  −0.13  1.15  0.04  −0.13  1.08
−4  −0.13  0.02* −1.97* −0.12  0.20  −1.93*
−3  0.21  −0.14  2.13** 0.22  −0.13  2.17**
−2 0.01 −0.03 0.27 0.01  −0.02  0.19
−1 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.11
0 −0.15 0.11 −1.42 −0.14 0.12 −1.46
1  0.07  0.19  −0.75  0.08  0.21  −0.75
2  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.07  −0.006
3  0.001  0.20  −1.37  0.01  0.21  −1.34
4  −0.05 0.20  −1.72* −0.04  0.22  −1.71*
5  0.09 0.00 0.61 0.10  0.01  0.63
6  0.13 0.18 −0.25 0.14  0.20  −0.29
7  −0.07 0.09 0.87 −0.05 0.10  −0.85
(−7,7) 0.24 0.77 −0.80  0.41  0.97  −0.88
(−5,0) 0.02 0.01 0.042 0.07  0.08  −0.01
(−3,0) 0.11 −0.04 0.49 0.14 0.01  0.44
(−1,0) −0.11 0.13 −1.04 −0.01  0.16  −1.11
(−1,1)  −0.03  0.32  −1.30  −0.003  0.36  −1.36
(0,1)  −0.07  0.30  −1.56  −0.06  0.33  −1.60
(0,3)  −0.01  0.55  −1.57  0.01  0.60  −1.65*
(0,5)  0.01  0.75  −1.75* 0.07  0.83  −1.80*
(0,7)  0.08  1.02  −2.03** 0.17  1.12  −2.10**
* p value < 0.1.
** p value < 0.05.
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Stock  price  models
Table 6  panel  A  presents  the  results  for  the  price  equa-
tion. The  first  one  includes  the  accounting  variables  only.*** p value < 0.01.
Further,  we  test  whether  announcement  returns  reported
in panel  C  are  statistically  different  from  returns  reported  in
panel A  and  B.  Results  are  reported  in  Table  5.  It  can  be  seen
that four  and  three  days  before  the  announcement  as  well  as
four days  afterwards  mean  returns  are  significantly  greater
for announcement  related  to  governing  bodies.  Accord-
ingly, differences  are  also  significant  during  time  intervals:
(0, 3),  (0,  5),  and  (0,  7),  showing  that  the  reactions  to
governing bodies’  news  are  larger  in  magnitude  and  signif-
icance. Therefore,  there  is  evidence  supporting  Hypothesis
1b; the  market  reacts  differently  to  news  on  governing  bod-
ies’ recommendations  that  are  the  least  trivial  and  most
costly, of  all  three.  Further,  some  of  these  recommenda-
tions are  legally  enforced  by  additional  legislation  different
from the  ACGC,  increasing  recommendations’  credibility.
Therefore, markets  react  more  significantly  to  recommenda-
tions that  have  more  credibility  and  are  easier  to  evaluate.
These results  show  the  importance  of  both  distinguish-
ing between  different  types  of  announcements  and  taking
into account  the  timeliness  of  information,  since  it  reveals
which kind  of  news  is  indeed  having  a  significant  market
reaction.
Tables 3--5  show  that  Spanish  market  reacts  significantly
to news  associated  to  the  adoption  of  ACGC  recommen-
dations. Furthermore,  these  results  maintain  qualitative
invariant if  we  take  into  account  the  restriction  of  no  event-
induced variance  and  also  when  we  use  a  nonparametric best,  the  Corrado  test,  instead  of  the  t-test  presented.1 It
s also  shown  the  relevance  of  analyzing  different  types  of
ews on  codes  of  best  practice.
ssociation  analysis
inancial  statement  information  is  expected  to  be  positively
elated to  prices  and  stock  returns.  In  addition,  we  propose
hat information  disclosed  on  ACGC  can  also  help  explaining
arket value.
In estimating  the  relationship  between  market  value,
ccounting variables  and  corporate  governance  news,  we
se panel  data  estimation  methodology  to  take  advantage
f the  time  structure  of  data.  The  estimation  takes  into
ccount the  possible  existence  of  non-observable  hetero-
eneity. Following  the  results  from  the  Hausman  test,  the
andom effect  estimation  is  used  in  all  runs.  All  estimations
nclude time  dummies.  Results  are  collected  in  Table  6.1 The BMP test and the Corrado test are not presented here for
revity  but are available upon request.
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Table  6  Association  analysis.
Panel  A:  Price  models
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
BV  1.2115*** (0.2022)  1.1364*** (0.2054)  1.1242*** (0.2030)  1.1273*** (0.2047)  1.1046*** (0.2092)
EPS  4.9111*** (0.9284)  4.9524*** (0.9455)  4.9140*** (0.9442)  4.8802*** (0.9459)  4.9152*** (0.9432)
CG  −1.0479  (1.9188)
Fiduciary  −0.9630  (2.3454)
Transparency −0.9041 (3.4180)
Governing  Bodies 0.7038  (2.3579)
Constant 4.4099  (5.3988) 17.9238*** (5.9346) 4.2548 (5.4069) 18.1932*** (6.4302) 16.6563*** (6.4364)
Observations  104  104  104  104  104
R squared  0.63  0.64  0.64  0.63  0.63
Hausman test  3.89  6.56  9.47  8.17  8.07
Panel  B:  Return  models
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
EPS  0.02412  (0.0257)  0.2478  (0.0259)  0.0201  (0.02524)  0.0250  (0.0251)  0.0242  (0.0258)
EPS 0.7868* (0.4095)  0.8107* (0.4191)  0.9555** (0.4083)  0.8888** (0.4034)  0.7781* (0.4151)
CG  −0.0171  (0.0584)
Fiduciary  −0.1657** (0.0742)
Transparency  −0.2393** (0.1054)
Governing bodies  0.0123  (0.0747)
Constant  0.1563  (0.1030)  0.1253  (0.1062)  0.2113** (0.1013)  0.3013** (0.1279)  0.1451  (0.1180)
Observations  105  105  105  105  105
R  squared  0.11  0.11  0.15  0.16  0.11
Hausman  test  0.51  2.46  0.72  1.55  2.88
Standard errors in parentheses.
Panel  A: The estimated model is Pit = ˛0 + ˛1BVit + ˛2EPSit + ˛3CGit + uit. BV is book value of equity, EPS is the earnings per share ratio,
CG  is the degree of disclosure of the ACGC and Fiduciary, Transparency and Gov. bodies the degree of disclosure of different types of
recommendations.
Panel B: The estimated model is Rit = ˛0 + ˛1EPSit + ˛2EPSit + ˛3CGit + uit. EPS is the earnings per share ratio, EPS is the change in
earnings per share, CG is the degree of disclosure of the ACGC and Fiduciary, Transparency and Governing bodies the degree of disclosure
of different types of recommendations.
* Significant at 10%.
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fterwards,  we  add  the  corporate  governance  news  varia-
les one  at  a  time.  When  accounting  variables  are
ntroduced alone  (column  1),  both  the  coefficient  on  book
alue of  equity  (BV)  and  the  coefficient  on  earnings  per
hare (EPS)  are  positive  and  significant.  The  significance
f accounting  variables  maintains  throughout  the  different
pecifications, suggesting  the  relevance  of  accounting  infor-
ation in  market  value  (columns  2--5).
In  column  2,  we  introduce  the  CG  variable  on  ACGC
nnouncements. The  R2 shows  a  slight  increase  improving
he estimation  of  stock  prices.  However,  its  coefficient  is
ot significant;  hence,  those  firms  that  disclose  more  news
n ACGC  compliance  do  not  present  higher  or  lower  share
rices. This  result  goes  against  Goncharov  et  al.  (2006)
hat find  a  positive  and  significant  effect  for  the  German
arket. Distinguishing  among  corporate  governance  news
oes not  alter  this  main  result  (columns  3--5).  Therefore,
ccording to  our  analysis  news  about  corporate  governance
o not  incorporate  credible  information  to  investors  in  the
edium-long term  and  it  would  not  be  associated  to  higher
rices.
h
t
t
mtock return  models
able 6,  panel  B  reports  the  results  of  the  effect  of  corporate
overnance announcements  on  stock  returns.  The  coeffi-
ient of  earnings  per  share  (EPS)  is  not  significant,  whereas
hanges in  earnings  (EPS)  present  a  positive  and  significant
stimate (column  1).  The  sign  and  significance  of  these  esti-
ates are  maintained  through  the  different  specifications.
herefore, financial  information  plays  a  prominent  role  in
xplaining price  and  return  reactions.  We  then  include  the
G variable  and,  as  in  the  case  of  the  price  models,  the
oefficient is  not  significant,  suggesting  that  news  on  ACGC
s not  associated  to  higher  stock  returns  either  (column  2).
his  result  is  similar  to  Goncharov  et  al.  (2006).  Results  differ
hen we  distinguish  between  the  types  of  announcement.  If
e look  at  fiduciary  and  transparency  news,  the  coefficients
re negative  and  significant.  Therefore,  announcements  on
duciary duties  and  transparency  are  not  associated  to
igher but  to  lower  returns  (columns  3  and  4).  This  suggests
hat this  kind  of  news  may  be  acting  as  a  negative  signal
o market  participants  as  a  result  of  the  triviality  of  recom-
endations. A  complementary  explanation  would  be  that
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Table  7  Price  and  return  equations  with  self-selection  controls.
Panel  A.  Price  equation
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
BV  1.2583*** (0.2134)  1.2728*** (0.2081)  0.1039*** (0.0345)  1.1621*** (0.2209)
EPS  4.6446*** (0.9550)  4.6498*** (0.9577)  5.4825*** (1.0530)  4.7250*** (0.9485)
PRED  CG  −0.1630  (9.3283)
PRED  fidu  −2.7075  (7.6535)
PRED transp 2.6677  (11.66486)
PRED gov 8.7606  (7.5396)
Constant 17.2748  (5.8511) 17.2392*** (5.5408) −0.9708  (9.2956) 3.0898  (5.8988)
R squared 0.66  0.67  0.54  0.67
Observations  101  101  101  101
Hausman test  7.53  9.91  7.91  8.31
Panel  B.  Return  equation
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
EPS  0.0242  (0.0268)  0.0196  (0.0265)  0.0219  (0.0270)  0.0231  (0.0267)
EPS  0.831* (0.4346)  0.8107* (0.4189)  0.7947* (0.4248)  0.7941* (0.4233)
PRED CG  −0.0577  (0.1828)
PRED  fidu  −0.2662  (0.2065)
PRED  transp  0.1119  (0.2266)
PRED gov  −0.0053  (0.1324)
Constant  0.1711  (0.1111)  0.2400  (0.1231)  0.1140  (0.1427)  0.1554  (0.1058)
R  squared  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11
Observations  102  102  102  102
Hausman  test  1.36  0.84  1.11  1.66
Standard errors in parentheses.
Panel  A: The estimated model is Pit = ˛0 + ˛1BVit + ˛2EPSit + ˛3PREDit + uit. BV is book value of equity, EPS is the earnings per share and
PRED is the predicted degree of disclosure of different types of recommendations namely PRED CG, PRED fidu, PRED transp and PRED gov.
Panel B: The estimated model is Rit = ˛0 + ˛1EPSit + ˛2EPSit + ˛3PREDit + uit. EPS is the earnings per share ratio, EPS is the change in
earnings per share and PRED is the predicted degree of disclosure of different types of recommendations namely PRED CG, PRED fidu,
PRED transp and PRED gov.
* Significant at 10%.
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Results  are  collected  in  Table  7.  Price  and  stock  return
models are  presented  in  panel  A  and  B  respectively.  PanelSignificant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
firm  decisions  on  fiduciary  duties  and  transparency  before
the introduction  of  ACGC  were  already  value  maximizing.
Therefore, code  actions  to  regulate  governance  related  to
fiduciary duties  that  promote  different  agreements  could
result in  less  efficient  contracts  and  be  value  destroying
(Hermalin, 2010).  The  introduction  of  governing  bodies  news
does not  provide  significant  results  (columns  5).  The  general
message of  price  and  stock  return  models  is  that  news  on
ACGC compliance  does  not  have  market  value  relevance  in
the medium  and  long  term.
The self  selection  issue
Although interesting,  the  above  results  should  be  inter-
preted with  caution.  In  value  relevance  models,  financial
variables are  exogenous.  On  the  contrary,  variables  account-
ing for  news  on  corporate  governance  are  potentially
endogenous. Although  the  introduction  of  ACGC  can  be
considered exogenous,  firms  can  act  strategically  and  may
consider advantageous  to  disclose  sooner  (later)  news  on
code recommendations  than  its  competitors.  In  other  words,
the association  between  corporate  governance  news  and
market value  may  be  driven  by  specific  firm  characteristics bather  than  by  adopting  new  regulations  per  se.  To  over-
ome this  weakness,  we  run  a  two-step  procedure  similar
o Cazavan-Jeny  and  Jeanjean  (2006)  and  Goncharov  et  al.
2006). In  the  first  stage,  we  model  the  decision  to  dis-
lose as  a  linear  combination  of  firm  features.  In  particular,
e include  variables  related  to  (a)  ownership  structure
b) financial  structure,  (c)  board  structure  features  and
d) competitive  situation  (see  Köke,  2002)2. In  the  sec-
nd step,  we  include  in  our  price  and  return  regressions
he predicted  value  of  corporate  governance  announce-
ents (PRED  CG)  and  its  different  components  (PRED  fidu,
RED transp,  PRED  gov)  from  our  step  one  model  as  addi-
ional variables.  The  inclusion  of  PRED  CG  and  its  individual
spects helps  us  to  control  for  the  effect  of  variables  asso-
iated with  the  decision  to  make  more  announcements  on2 Description of the variables used in the first step and results have
een  omitted for brevity but are available upon request.
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 confirms  that  financial  information  is  relevant  to  explain-
ng stock  price,  further  news  on  ACGC  is  not  value-relevant
nformation for  determining  stock  prices  (column  1).  Indi-
idual aspects  offer  the  same  results  as  the  global  CG
ariable (columns  2--4).  Therefore,  when  controlling  for
otential endogeneity  and  distinguishing  between  different
ypes announcements,  disclosure  on  ACGC  does  not  have
alue effects  over  the  medium  and  long  term.
In  the  stock  return  regression  (panel  B),  the  predicted
alue of  different  types  of  corporate  governance  news  as
ell as  the  predicted  value  for  the  aggregate  measure
re insignificant.  Therefore,  after  controlling  for  endogene-
ty, news  on  corporate  governance  or  its  individual  aspects
re not  relevant  information  in  determining  stock  returns,
uggesting that  our  previous  result  for  fiduciary  and  trans-
arency announcements  was  driven  by  self-selection.  This
eneral result  for  corporate  governance  is  against  evidence
ound by  Goncharov  et  al.  (2006)  for  the  German  market  who
nd a  positive  and  significant  result.  This  is  not  the  case  in
he Spanish  market  where  investors  do  not  seem  to  value
orporate governance  news  in  the  medium-long  term.
onclusions
his  paper  analyzes  the  information  content  of  corporate
overnance announcements  following  the  publication  of  the
ldama Code  by  Spanish  quoted  companies  during  the  period
003--2005. For  that,  we  present  two  complementary  anal-
ses: an  event  study  and  an  association  analysis.  In  both
ases, we  distinguish  between  different  types  of  announce-
ents according  to  the  ACGC  classification  and  take  into
ccount the  timeliness  of  information.  This  analysis  allows
roviding deeper  insights  of  the  consequences  of  disclosure
n corporate  governance  codes  and  helps  disentangle  previ-
us contradictory  evidence.
Results  are  interesting  in  two  respects.  First  they  show
hat Spanish  market  reacts  to  news  on  code  compliance  in
he short  run.  Second,  the  possibility  of  distinguishing  among
ifferent type  of  recommendations  show  that  announce-
ents which  are  more  demanding  in  terms  of  company
ommitment with  corporate  governance  present  a  posi-
ive and  significant  price  reaction.  This  reaction  turns  out
o be  greater  the  higher  the  impact  of  the  recommen-
ation adopted  on  reducing  agency  problems  (governing
odies news).  However,  this  kind  of  information  is  not  value-
elevant for  investor  long-term  decision  making.
This  study  has  demonstrated  that  Spanish  markets  react
o news  on  ACGC  code  compliance  in  the  short  run.  How-
ver, codes  and  legislation  evolve  together  with  markets
nd investors.  Firm  corporate  governance  will  be  evaluated
gainst actual  codes,  probably  more  demanding.  Market  will
robably react  to  adoptions  that  essentially  reflect  the  ideal
bjective of  good  corporate  governance,  as  was  the  case  of
he ACGC.
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